Jungian Studies

Paul Budding

Revised Edition
The two essays in this paper are titled (1) *Jung in Context: The Historical context of Jungian Analytical Psychology* and (2) *Schools of Jungian Analytical Psychology*. They demonstrate a necessary familiarity with the field that is a prerequisite for being able to take a critical approach towards Jungian Studies in general. Of course Jungian Studies is not one within itself as the *Schools of Jungian Analytical Psychology* essay title makes obvious. Hence it is necessary to be familiar with Jung’s own work, its context and subsequent developments within the field that are often referred to as ‘Post’ Jungian.
JUNG IN CONTEXT

The historical context of Jungian analytical psychology

Claire Douglas’ chapter titled ‘The historical context of analytical psychology’ (in ‘The Cambridge Companion to Jung’) and Sonu Shamdasani’s Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science, are the two main sources used in this essay. These sources enable us to effectively sketch the historical context of Jung’s psychology.

Douglas rightly touches upon a multitude of influences on Jung. She starts off by saying that Jung himself referred to two aspects of his psyche, one that is empirical, rational, practical and so on, and another that is romantic and “at home with the unconscious, the mysterious, and the hidden whether in hermetic science and religion, in the occult, or in fantasies and dreams.” Already a key Jungian belief about the psyche is implied here. And that is that the human psyche has evolved (in the western world) to the point where it can think and rationalize (hence at its height it creates scientific and mathematical models, philosophies and the technology that we see around us) whilst the psyche is also fantasy prone, it dreams, is emotional and so forth. Despite Jung’s belief that this description of the psyche is true, Douglas correctly writes that “Analytical psychology still struggles to hold the tension of these opposites with different schools, or leanings, or even schisms, veering first to one side of the pole, then to the other.” However, Jung’s perspective is supported in this work because both rationalism and irrationalism are psychological realities.

Before outlining the historical context of Jung’s psychology it would suit our purpose to merely list some of the influences and then to expand. The following list is not exhaustive by any means, remember Jung was an erudite. Nevertheless, the following were amongst the major contextual influences. Romanticism was an influence, as was Positivism, Kant, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Schelling, Carus, Nietzsche, Shamanism, Janet, Freud, Flournoy, parapsychology, Swedenborg, James, Eastern spirituality, Gnosticism and Alchemy. We will discuss Romanticism and Positivism first.

**Romanticism and Positivism**

Jung always insisted that he was scientific. Douglas explains that “Jung’s university teachers held an almost religious belief in the possibilities of positivistic science and faith in the scientific method. Positivism […] focused on the power of reason, experimental science, and the study of general laws and hard facts. It gave a linear, forwardly progressing, and optimistic slant to history […] Positivism gave Jung invaluable training in and respect for empirical science. Jung’s medical-psychiatric background is clearly revealed in his empirical research, his careful clinical observation and case histories, his skill in diagnosis, and his formulation of projective tests.” Hence, Jung was influenced
by the enlightenment and scientific revolution like other great names of his day. However the rationalist scientist in Jung would often be organizing irrational data in an attempt to understand it. (e.g. fantasies, dreams, myths, and even the disorganized, dissociated ramblings of psychotics). This leads us nicely to Romanticism. The Romantics sought a unity with nature whose connection had been lost. The Romantics also focused on irrational phenomena and inner reality. Here of course, Jung and the Romantics sought meaning. For Jung, meaning was found in the inner world hence it would be most beneficial, he thought, to apply science towards this realm. Douglas writes that the Romantics had a “fascination with studies of possession, multiple personalities, seers, mediums, and trancers, as well as with shamans, exorcists, magnetizers, and hypnotic healers […] and that […] they all employed altered states of consciousness that linked one psyche to another and made use of the various ways healer and healed enter this vast, omnipresent, yet still mysterious collective world.”

Douglas traces Romanticism “from the pre-Socratic philosophers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, through Plato, to the Romanticism of the early nineteenth century and its revival at the end of that century.” In Jung’s autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, he writes that he was “attracted to the thought of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Plato, despite their long-windedness of Socratic argumentation.”

It is well-known that by the end of the 19th century Romantic themes were expressed in much of the most famous literary works. Douglas points to the following as having been inspired by Romanticism: “Hugo, Balzac, Dickens, Poe, Dostoevsky, Maupassant, Nietzsche, Wilde, R. L. Stevenson, George du Maurier, and Proust.” Douglas continues: “As a Swiss student, Jung spoke and read German, French, and English and so had access to these writers as well as to his own nation’s popular literature.”

It is fair to point out that Jung, whilst on the one hand declaring his work, ‘scientific’, on the other hand, declared his work as cultural: “whatever happens in a given moment has inevitably the quality peculiar to that moment.” This apparent contradiction is explained as Jung viewing his work as an evolving science. Even in physics the discipline doesn’t stand still. And in psychology Jung often said that ideas require updating in order to express and be conducive with the specific time and place.

The Romantic Philosophers who influenced the ideas of analytical psychology include “Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Hegel and Nietzsche.” Jung wrote that “mentally my greatest adventure had been the study of Kant and Schopenhauer.” For example, there is similarity between Jung’s archetypes hypothesis and Kant’s categories. Shamdasani writes that in 1918 Jung “defined the primordial images as a priori conditions for fantasy-production, and likened the primordial image to Kantian categories. […] In Psychological Types, he refined his understanding of the relation between ideas, images and archetypes. In his use, idea had a close connection with image. Images could be personal or impersonal. These impersonal images, distinguished by their mythological quality, were the primordial images. When these lacked this mythological character and perceptible images, he referred to them as ideas. The idea was the meaning of the primordial image. Thus ideas were originally derived from primordial images.” Jung concurred with Kant, who for Jung, “had shown that the mind was not tabula rasa.” as “certain categories of thinking are given a priori.”

Meanwhile Marilyn Nagy points out
that for both Jung and Kant “there is something inside the individual which knows what
to do and how to act. Knowledge which is of crucial importance for the human individual
is won at the moment when we acknowledge a priori inner experience, experience which
is not dictated by the perceptual and sensual power of the outer object. For Kant this was
the experience of the categorical imperative. For Jung it was the experience of the Self.”
Arthur Schopenhauer was another favorite of Jung’s. Jung praised “the centrality
accorded to suffering by Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, whom he described as the
formers intellectual heir. [Moreover Jung said] To Schopenhauer I owe the dynamic view
of the psyche; the ‘will’ is the libido that is back of everything.” Shamdasani then writes
that this passage (and others by Jung) “suggest[s] that [Jung’s] initial concept of psychic
energy was derived from Schopenhauer’s concept of the will.” The blindness of the
Schopenhaurian will is clear in the following quote by the philosopher quoted in
Shamdasani: “the works of animal instinct, the spiders web, the honeycomb of bees, the
structure of termites, and so on, are all of them constituted as if they had originated in
consequence of an intentional conception, far-reaching and rational deliberation, whereas
they are obviously the work of a blind impulse, that is, of a will which is not guided by
knowledge.” However, Shamdasani says that Jung “followed Hartmann […] adopting
von Hartmann’s reformulations of Schopenhauer’s philosophy [such as that] found in his
lecture “Thoughts on the nature and value of speculative inquiry” [where Jung endorses
Hartmann’s view and adds] the absolutely essential element of purposeful intention” to
the will/psychic energy.
It should be noted that whilst Jung approved of Schopenhauer’s attention given to
suffering in life, Jung (of course) regarded suffering as only one important area of life
and also gave a great deal of attention to the meaning of life.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was admired greatly by Jung. Jung often referred to
Goethe’s masterpiece ‘Faust’ whereby Faust struggles with inner conflict.
Further inspirations were F. W. von Schelling and Carl Gustav Carus. The latter should
strike the reader as having remarkably similar ideas to Jung. “Carus depicted the creative,
autonomous, and healing function present in the unconscious. He saw the life of the
psyche as a dynamic process in which consciousness and the unconscious are mutually
compensatory and where dreams play a restorative role in psychic equilibrium. Carus
also outlined a tripartite model of the unconscious – the general absolute, the partial
absolute, and the relative – that prefigured Jung’s concepts of archetypal, collective, and
personal unconscious.” Why then is Carus not given more credit in analytical
psychology? One Jungian thinker says that it is simply because Carus didn’t offer
treatment. Nevertheless Jung himself valued Carus’ work. Shamdasani writes “Jung
stated that his own conceptions were “much more like Carus than Freud…” On the other
hand Jung writes (in Memories, Dreams, Reflections) that Carus (and Hartmann) both
failed to empirically ground their theories of the unconscious. Hence they remained
philosophically speculative. Jung writes that it was Freud who first “demonstrated
empirically the presence of an unconscious psyche.” Shamdasani writes that Jung
regarded the unconscious as an idea “introduced into philosophy by Lebinz, and that Kant
and Schelling had expressed views on it. It had subsequently been elaborated into a
system by Carus, and then by von Hartmann, who had been significantly influenced by
Carus In 1940 he [i.e. Jung] wrote that though philosophers such as Lebinz, Kant, and Schelling had drawn attention to the “problem of the dark soul”, it was Carus, a physician who had been impelled “to point to the unconscious as the essential ground of the soul.” In 1945, he went so far as to say of Carus that if he had been living today, he would have been a psychotherapist. Indeed, the psychology of the unconscious began with Carus, who did not realize that he had built the “philosophical bridge to a future empirical psychology.” However, Carus and Hartmann’s philosophical conceptions of the unconscious “had gone down under the overwhelming wave of materialism and empiricism.” It was only after this that the concept of the unconscious reappeared “in the scientifically orientated medical psychology.”

Jung lectured on Nietzsche observing various affinities with his own psychology especially the going beyond black and white good and evil. Douglas also rightly points especially to “the way negativity and resentment shadowed behavior.” Shamdasani notes that “For Jung, Nietzsche had correctly recognized the general significance of the drives.” Shamdasani continues, “In 1917 in The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes, posing the question of whether anyone knew what it meant to affirm the drives, Jung noted that this was what Nietzsche desired and taught. This made the ‘case’ of Nietzsche especially critical, as “he who thus taught saying yes to the life drive, must have his own life looked at critically in order to discover the effects of this teaching upon him who gave the teaching.” Hence Jung was especially interested in studying Nietzsche.

Shamdasani highlights the importance of William James and Theodore Flournoy on Jung whilst qualifying this by admitting that he is nominating them as “but two of a plethora of other figures.” Shamdasani says that Jung described them “as the only two outstanding minds with whom he was able to conduct uncomplicated conversations.” Shamdasani continues “For Jung, as for Flournoy and James before him, a necessary condition for the possibility of a psychology was that it should consider all human phenomena.” The main source that Jungian researchers can attain for evidence of the influence of Flournoy and James on Jung’s thinking is from an “unpublished draft (now in the Jung Archives at the Countway Library in Boston). [There] Jung writes […] extensively of his debt to Flournoy and William James.”

Jung’s interest in the paranormal (or parapsychological) is well-documented. A good example of this is his reading of Emmanuel Swedenborg. Jung discusses some of Swedenborg’s visions in his Collected Works. And in Memories, Dreams, Reflections Jung writes that (in his student years) he “read seven volumes of Swedenborg.” Douglas says on this area, “Jung’s interest in and knowledge about parapsychology adds a rich though suspect edge to analytical psychology which demands attention congruent with the extended scope of scientific knowledge today.”

A major influence on the more clinically-minded Jung is that of the French dissociationist psychiatrist, Pierre Janet. Jung studied under Janet and the latter pioneered theories of dissociation and fixed ideas, which Jung termed ‘complexes’. Jung agreed with a great deal of what Janet pioneered but Jung also embraced the artistic and creative side of life. Hence Jung went beyond Janet who was “clearly no Romantic.” The work of John R
Haule is scholarly and studies the link between analytical psychology and Janet’s dissociationist psychology. Haule had his key essay on Jung’s dissociationism published in *Jung in Contexts.* In the foreword to that book Anthony Storr also emphasizes above all else, the significance of dissociation and complexes on Jung. Storr reminds us of Jung’s early career in the Burgholzli Mental Hospital in Zurich. Storr writes… “Jung’s interest in dissociation and splitting was reinforced by his daily encounters with chronic schizophrenics whose personalities, he concluded, were fragmented; that is disintegrated into many parts rather than merely dissociated into two or three recognizable subsidiary personalities.” Storr also reminds us of Jung’s first published paper, *On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena.* That paper was based on Jung’s cousin, Helene Preiswerk. Helene claimed that dead spirits spoke through her but Jung interpreted the voices as alternate personalities, different personalities of Helene “which had become dissociated from her normal ego.” Storr also emphasizes Jung’s Word association Tests that enabled Jung to refer to his Complex Psychology. In the first ever edition of the International Journal of Jungian Studies, Paula A. Monahan sought to place emphasis on the influence of Janet’s dissociationist psychology on Jung’s work.

Janet is more relevant than Freud as an influence on Jung, as Jung valued the principle of dissociation as sovereign over repression although he recognized both of those principles. Nevertheless, Jung recognized Freud as a pioneer of the unconscious. Interested thinkers often point out that Jung himself was a childhood neurotic. This may be seen as a slight digression because this establishes a personal context for analytical psychology as opposed to the multitude of impersonal historical contextual influences. However, it is the other key factor in establishing a sketch of the context of Jung’s work. Jung had a father complex. Carl Jung’s father is portrayed as an authoritarian and dogmatic Christian who had repressed doubts about his faith. And Jung is regarded as having been a childhood neurotic in both Jungian and psychoanalytical literature. For example in the latter, Winnicott reads *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* as evidence of Jung as a childhood schizophrenic, a divided-self in search of a self-identity. In the Jungian literature, Michael Fordham, who helped compile Jung’s Collected Works, also regards Jung as having been a childhood schizophrenic. Following reading the first draft of the childhood chapters of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* Jung asked Fordham for his views. Fordham replied that he regarded Jung as having been “a schizophrenic child” with strong obsessional defenses, and that had he been brought to me I should have said the prognosis was good, but that I should have recommended analysis – He did not consent my blunt statement.” Anthony Stevens meanwhile, arguably takes up the conventional position on Jung as a childhood neurotic who creatively compensated for his lack of emotional connection to the outer social world. Stevens writes that Jung “resembled other intellectual pioneers […] such as […] Issac Newton and Rene Descartes.” Like them “he did not feel at home in the [outer] world” and hence compensated by becoming pioneering and “intellectually objective about it.” Stevens continues by arguing that Jung’s ideas “of the collective unconscious, his theory of archetypes, his psychological typology and his description of the structure and function of the psyche were at once consequences of his emotional isolation and brilliant attempts to compensate for it. It was no accident that the principle of compensation
between inner and outer realms of experience became the cornerstone of analytical psychology.”

The same desire to compensate for childhood neurosis is, as Stevens says, evident in Issac Newton’s work, see footnote.

Jung inevitably cast an eye on Eastern spirituality. Whilst cautious of the westerner grasping at Eastern texts, symbols and so forth, he nevertheless understood that the East tended to seek a way beyond conflicts, striving for “balance and harmony” through paths of “self-discipline and self-realization [and] through the withdrawal of projections and through yoga, meditation, and introspection, paths that were similar to a deep analytic process.”

Finally, the influence of Gnosticism and especially Alchemy on Jungian psychology is (at least in the latter) obvious, as Jung writes on alchemy in three volumes of his collected works. And in Memories, Dreams, Reflections Jung makes the connection between alchemy and his psychology, clear himself. He writes “I had very soon seen that analytical psychology coincided in a most curious way with alchemy. The experiences of the alchemists were, in a sense, my experiences, and their world was my world. This was, of course, a momentous discovery: I had stumbled upon the historical counterpart of my psychology of the unconscious. The possibility of a comparison with alchemy, and the uninterrupted intellectual chain back to Gnosticism, gave substance to my psychology. When I pored over these old texts everything fell into place: the fantasy-images, the empirical material I had gathered in my practice, and the conclusions I had drawn from it. I now began to understand what these psychic contents meant when seen in historical perspective.”

Notes

1: This essay is a moderately revised version of a paper that I wrote in 2008

Lavin, T, 2005, points out that Jung originally referred to his work as Complex Psychology and that a very close colleague of Jung’s, Professor C. A. Meier continued to do so even after Jung’s other close colleagues began to refer to his work as Analytical Psychology.


3: Shamdasani, S, 2003


5: ibid

6: In his book, “Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science” Jung historian, Sonu Shamdasani, discusses a debate between Jung and E. A. Bennet. The debate is about the scientific credentials of Jung’s psychology. Jung claims that his psychology is scientific because of its applicability. Jung could not see any more applicable theories anywhere else. What Jung meant by applicability was “its application as a principle of
understanding and a heuristic means to an end as it is characteristic of each scientific theory.”
(Jung C, in Shamdasani, S, 2003, p98)
Jung’s view was that a theory had to offer a satisfactory explanation that makes sense of life. That, for Jung, is the true quality of a theory. And it had to have a heuristic value in order to be whole. If it failed to be heuristic it would be one-sided. And for Jung, no matter how true a one-sided viewpoint is, it remains incomplete. Furthermore in the same debate with Bennet, Jung argued that it isn’t good enough to argue that psychic facts should be analogous to chemical or physical proof. How one proves something has to take into account the discipline that they are dealing with. Hence Jung argued “the question ought to be formulated: what is physical, biological, psychological, legal and philosophical evidence?” (Jung, C, in Shamdasani, S, 2003, p99). So Jung argued that there was an Anglo-Saxon bias on what was deemed to be scientific, again referring to physics and chemistry. Moreover, “psyche is the mother of all our attempts to understand Nature, but in contradistinction to all others it tries to understand itself by itself, a great disadvantage in one way and an equally great prerogative in the other!” (ibid)

10: Jung, C, 1995, p87
12: ibid
13: ibid
14: Jung said this about all ideas, fearing that otherwise they would become dogmatic. For example, he said it about Christianity; see Jung, C, 1977, p736, par. 1665 & 1666
16: Jung, C, 1977, p213, par. 485
17: Shamdasani, S, 2003, p235
18: Shamdasani, S, 2003, p236
19: Jung, C, in Shamdasani, S, 2003, p236
21: Jung, C, in Shamdasani, S, 2003, p198
22: ibid
23: Shamdasani, S, 2003, p199
24: ibid
28: Shamdasani, S, 2003, p164 & 165
29: Jung, C, 1995, p193
30: Shamdasani, S, 2003, p165
31: Jung, C, in Shamdasani, S, 2003, p165
32: Jung, C, in Shamdasani, S, 2003, p165 & 166
33: Shamdasani, S, 2003, p166
34: Jung, C, & Jarret, J. L, 1988
36: Shamdasani, S, 2003, p251
37: Jung, C, in Shamdasani, S, 2003, p251
38: Shamdasani, S, 1999, p540
39: ibid
40: ibid
42: Jung, C, 1995, p120

46: Storr, A, in Bishop, P, 1999, pxi

47: ibid

48 ibid

49: Storr, A, in Bishop, P, 1999, pxiii

50: Monahan, P. A, 2009, p33 – 49

51: Jung, C, 1995, p192 & 193

52: Winnicott, D, in Papadopoulos, R, 1992, p320


54: Stevens, A, 1999, p111

55: Stevens, A, 1999, p112

56: ibid

57: The following is extracted from Farndon, J, et al (2005) The Great Scientists (Arcturus Publishing Ltd) and is quoted here because it demonstrates through an example, the classical Jungian principle of compensation: Issac Newton’s “father was already dead by the time Newton was born. When he was just 18 months old, his poor widowed mother married a wealthy old local minister […] but left the infant Issac with his grandparents. It may be that Issac never recovered from his early abandonment. Even though his mother returned home to her son when her new husband died seven years later, Issac later confessed that he remembered ‘threatening my (step) father and mother to burn them and their house over them.’ Throughout his life, Newton carried a terrible suppressed anger and sense of resentment that made him a very difficult man to deal with. The introverted Issac went to school at the age of 12 but showed no signs of any intellectual prowess until he was bullied one day at school. In a towering rage the young Newton fought back until his larger opponent was a quivering wreck. But Newton did not stop there. He was determined to humiliate his opponent in the classroom too. Soon Newton became deeply involved in his academic pursuits, especially science, and amazed the locals with such things as handmade water clocks and flying lanterns.” (Farndon, J, et al, 2005, p59 & 60). Newton went on to make his great “discoveries” of “the law of gravity and the laws of motion.” (Farndon, J, et al, 2005, p61)

Bibliography


Schools of Jungian Analytical Psychology

Introduction

In this essay we discuss the Schools of Jungian Analytical Psychology. In doing so - we will inevitably focus on Andrew Samuel’s model of the classical, developmental and archetypal schools. In part 2 we will briefly discuss an example of a split within the world of Jungian psychology. This example will be concerning the most famous recent split that occurred in Zurich and was orchestrated by Carl Jung’s main collaborator, the late Marie Louise Von Franz.

Before Andrew Samuels came onto the scene and created his classical, developmental, and archetypal schools of Jungian psychology… the differences between Jungians were regarded as splits between London and Zurich. This (pre-Samuels) model - was in effect, Michael Fordham’s way of defining those within the Jungian world. It was a relatively effective model. But Samuels changed (or updated the model) because (for example) someone training to become a Jungian analyst in London could be closer to the purist position of Jung than Fordham’s psychoanalytical leanings. We should be clear here concerning what the general positions of Jungian training were (and are) in London and Zurich. And then we will move on to discuss Samuels updated version of 1985. Then, as said in part 2 we will discuss the most famous recent split in the world of Jungian psychology.

The splits between London and Zurich training schools consisted of a more psychoanalytical leaning in the former and more symbolic approach in the latter. In effect London was moving away from Jung and Zurich staying close to Jung. Kenneth Eisold, writing in his essay titled Institutional Conflicts in Jungian analysis, says that the London school, under Fordham’s leadership focused on “transference, regression, and infantile material.” Eisold therefore says that for those wanting pure Jungian training, Zurich was the place to go. To make the division clear, it is helpful to contrast Michael Fordham and Marie Louise Von Franz. This is because the former distances himself from cherished Jungian sacred cows such as alchemy and myth whilst the latter sees them as everything that is of value to psychological life.

Fordham’s psychoanalytical leanings are emphasized by him because he believes that many people in analysis are un-adapted to contemporary life and therefore too great a focus on the likes of myth and alchemy can easily further distance the patient from modern life. Obviously it is not unusual at all for a patient in analysis to require the exact opposite which would be adaption to contemporary life. Hence Fordham writes “The Achilles heel of the historical amplificatory method is this: the patient can never have been present in the historical context. A patient who produces archetypal material with striking alchemical parallels is not practicing in the alchemical laboratory, nor is he living in the religious and social setting to which alchemy was relevant. Therefore, it can become unrealistic… if this is thought of as alchemical… the patient becomes more divorced than before from his setting in contemporary life.”. But Carl Jung’s closest collaborator, Marie Louise Von Franz takes the exact opposite view to Michael Fordham. Von Franz is pure Jung… or Classical Jungian in the later (1985) updating of Jungian
terminology. Von Franz said that not only is alchemy a complete myth but that “civilization needs a myth to live by […] if our Western civilization has a possibility of survival, it would be by accepting the alchemical myth, which is a richer completion and continuation of the Christian myth.”. Von Franz, as a true classical Jungian greatly appreciates the symbolic importance of alchemy.

Whilst there was clearly some logic to the original London-Zurich way of interpreting someone working in – or with an interest in – Jungian psychology… it was also clearly problematic because it was often inaccurate. For example it needed modernizing because James Hillman’s archetypal psychology came onto the scene and was not represented by the old model. Also, what if you trained in London but were more classical Jungian in orientation? Andrew Samuels, the man who crafted a more specific description of the schools of analytical psychology said that he saw the problem with the original Fordham model as follows… “People used to talk about ‘London’ and ‘Zurich’. But even in the 1980s and certainly in the 1990s there are what we used to call ‘London’ analysts in Chicago and in San Francisco, and there are ‘Zurich’ analysts all over the world who have never been anywhere near Zurich.”. This leads us nicely into discussion of Samuel’s model concerning the schools of Jungian psychology.

**Part 1**

In part 1 of this essay we discuss the schools of Jungian Analytical psychology. In 1985 Andrew Samuels distinguished between three schools of Jungian thought… the Classical School, the Developmental School and the Archetypal School. Writing more recently he says: “To summarize, I said that there were three schools: (1) the classical school, consciously working in Jung’s tradition, with a focus on the self and individuation. I made the point that one should not equate classical with stuck or rigid. There are evolutions within something classical that are quite possible. (2) The developmental school, which has a specific take on the importance of infancy in the evolution of adult personality and character, and an equally stringent emphasis on the analysis of transference-countertransference dynamics in clinical work. The developmental school has a very close relationship with psychoanalysis, although the word *rapprochement* that is often used is quite wrong, because psychoanalysis does not *rapprocher* with analytical psychology, whereas analytical psychology makes frequent attempts at *rapprochement* with psychoanalysis. (3) The archetypal school plays with and exploits images in therapy. Its notion of soul suggests the deepening that permits an event to become an experience.”. Samuels says that he has since updated this system and that the archetypal school has now been integrated into the other two schools or eliminated as a clinical school. He also says that two new schools have emerged in analytical psychology… a fundamentalist school and a psychoanalytic school. Hence for Samuels the four schools are now “fundamentalist, classical, developmental, psychoanalytic.”. Samuels says that the fundamentalist school is an extreme version of the classical School and the psychoanalytic school is an extreme version of the developmental school. (See my essay in *Post Jungian Studies* titled *Jungian Fundamentalism*)
Wolfgang Giegerich is so revolutionary in his psychology that although he has been immersed in Jungian analytical psychology, he has worked his way right out of it. His seemingly sole emphasis on thinking and logic combined with his description of Jungian feeling as pre-modern and anathema to the present day means that he is scarcely Jungian at all. Much of what Giegerich says strikes me as true but it is possible to work off the Jungian field and make it relevant to today.

Whilst Giegerich actually claims to maintain the link with Jungian psychology I would categorize him as at least *radically Post-Jungian* but would not include him in any of the existing schools. This is not to underestimate him. David Tacey informed IAJS members that Giegerich “is a heavyweight, and it is often not noticed by Jungians in English speaking worlds. I have noticed a substantial following of him in Japan and South America […] and […] also in Korea, where scholars and writers are very interested in his work.”

Finally, John Dourley has referred to “Pre-Jungians”, as has Edward Edinger. This is clearly a swipe at the description of ‘Post-Jungian.’ Dourley’s reference to ‘pre-Jungians’ is difficult to sign up to. It would mean that we are all pre-Jungian. Hence the label ‘pre-Jungian’ is rejected here.

**Part 2**

This part of the essay discusses splits in Jungian analytical psychology. One of the most famous Jungian splits in recent years involved the split-off from the Zurich Institute. The Jung institute was formed in 1947 and the late Marie Louise Von Franz was the most popular teacher from the 1950s until the split in 1994. The split was orchestrated by Von Franz herself. Von Franz felt that the Zurich Institute was not honoring Jung’s ideas. She believed that it was diluting them. Von Franz wanted to honor Jung’s legacy, hence, she set up a new center called the Jung-Von Franz Centre or ‘Centrum’ in German. This clearly ideological split occurred in May 1994 and the Centrum has thrived since then. It is, however, *ironic* because the Zurich school is renowned for being Classical Jungian whilst the London school is renowned for being more developmentalist and psychoanalytical. However, Daniel Anderson who is currently a student at the Centrum writes that “some of the "London influence" was being felt in Zürich, too. For example, Mario Jacoby began to incorporate developmental strands, writing books on Narcissism and Individuation, and infant research”. Thomas Kirsch also has knowledge about what led to Von Franz causing the split. He says that Von Franz “wanted to keep the Institute pure. Some other senior analysts wanted to introduce things like group therapy and the teaching of group therapy, which upset "the purists" very much. They threatened to quit, which eventually they did. Then [as Daniel Anderson says] people like Mario Jacoby and Toni Frei went to London and brought back some of Fordham’s ideas to the old Jung Institute. So the developmental strand also came in at the Jung Institute”. Freud had been a topic from the very beginning at the Institute, but it was only theoretical and no Freudian actually taught at the Institute.” Von Franz and others were uncomfortable about these developments and hence, given the authority and influence that Von Franz had in the Jungian world, she had the ability to set up a new center. If Classical Jungian Psychology
has been watered down in Zurich, it still nevertheless leans towards the ‘classical’ whilst London, thanks to the late Michael Fordham, is clearly psychoanalytically orientated due to its developmental approach. Marie Louise Von Franz, being Jung’s main collaborator, ensured that the Centrum was purely classical Jungian. Daniel Anderson quotes the mission statement of the Centrum which is "The Centre was founded in order to create a place where the autonomous psyche can be considered with total commitment.". Clearly then Von Franz believed that Zurich was not a place where the autonomous psyche was considered with total commitment. David Tacey speculates that the split was caused by minor differences. He offers this view due to the fact that the Zurich Institute is regarded as Classical Jungian. Tacey says “Is this perhaps what Freud called "the narcissism of minor differences"? Or one group failing to live up to its own ego-ideal, thus creating anxiety and splitting?”. Tacey, whose thoughts on the schools of analytical psychology we discussed in part 1, also points out that in his country, Australia, the splits are the same as they are in London and Zurich. But he adds that there is more interest in Hillman, albeit not among the professionals. Presumably because the professional analysts regard Hillman as an artist.

Conclusion

In conclusion we can see that there are clearly differences within Jungian Analytical Psychology. Some of the differences are very wide. There is a great gulf between the Developmentalists (working in Michael Fordham’s tradition) and the Archetypalists. (working in James Hillman’s tradition). Looking at the differences between the Classical, Developmental and Archetypal schools is more exact than looking at differences between the likes of London and Zurich. Of course, the London and Zurich model had no place for Hillman’s archetypal psychology which is another reason why the modernization was necessary. Hence, Andrew Samuels was right to create his (original) improved descriptive model which has stood the test of time. There are general differences between London and Zurich but obviously you will find Classical Jungians in London and Developmentalists in Zurich who don’t fit the stereotype of Fordham’s (pre 1985 Samuel’s) model.

Notes

Introduction Notes

1: Eisold, K, 2001, p340
2: ibid
5: Sharp, D
Part 1 Notes

3: Tacey, D, 19th August 2008
4: Dourley, J, 1st December 2008
5: Edinger, E, in Jaffe, L

Part 2 Notes

1: Kirsch, T, 24th September 2008
2: Anderson, D, 23rd September 2008
3: Kirsch, T, 24th September 2008
4: Anderson, D, 23rd September 2008
5: Tacey, D, 23rd September 2008
6: ibid

Bibliography


Tacey, D, (19th August 2008) IAJS Discussion Forum: Topic: Schools of Analytical Psychology